| Abstract: | Firms employ salespeople to manage and increase product sales, and use incentive contracts to align the interests of the salesforce with those of the firm. Almost all of classical salesforce compensation literature assumes that the firm satisfies all of the demand induced by the salesperson’s effort. However, in many real-world situations, this assumption does not hold and the firm cannot sell more units than the inventory it stocks. Furthermore, inventory yield can be uncertain. In this talk, I will present two papers that tackle the salesforce incentive contracting problem in the presence of such operational considerations. In the first paper, I will discuss how demand censoring due to limited inventory influences salesforce compensation design. In the second paper, I will discuss how yield uncertainty influences the incentive contract as well as the timing of contracting. |
| Date: | 24 June 2016 |
| Time: | 11:00am - 12:00noon |
| Speaker: | Dr Tinglong Dai |
| Venue: | Room 7-208, 7/F, Academic 3 |
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