The Diplomacy Discount in Global Syndicated Loans

Gene Ambrocio Bank of Finland

Xian Gu Durham University

Iftekhar Hasan Fordham University, Bank of Finland, The University of Sydney

Panagiotis N. Politsidis Audencia Business School, European Banking Institute

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Introduction





What this paper does

- Investigates whether state-to-state political ties with a global superpower affect the pricing of international bank loans
- Does so by considering more than 10,000 global syndicated loans during 1992-2017
- Highlights the factors affecting the relation between political ties and the cost of credit
- war conflicts, Republican administrations, borrowers with better balance sheets and relationships with the lending banks
- Reveals which firms exploit this mechanism
- > firms with no financing flexibility and access to foreign capital markets; firms operating in countries with weak institutional environment








Cross-border bank claims I

- Cross-border bank-based financing remains an important segment of external financing globally
- Over USD 22 trillion in 2008 (see Figure)
- halt in the meteoric rise in cross-border bank lending due to the global financial crisis after an approximately three-fold expansion over the period 2000-2008



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Cross-border bank claims II

- Many other factors have since contributed to their relative decline following the crisis
- Geopolitical tensions have recently surfaced as a key factor
- > much of these tensions are linked to the U.S. and U.S. foreign policy
- U.S. leadership of a liberal international order is no longer tenable
- Shift toward a neo-mercantile approach under President Donald J. Trump
- Partnerships with states with shared interests and values





Findings

- A one-standard-deviation increase (improvement) in our political ties measure lowers loan spreads by approximately 13.5 basis points
- Economic significance: 9.1% lower all-in spread drawn (AISD) compared to the average loan in our sample
- > interest savings: USD 2.3 million for loans of average size and duration
- Easing effect of political ties is more potent:
- during war conflicts and geopolitical risk tensions; under Republican administrations; for more profitable, less leveraged and relationship borrowers
- Firms not relying on this mechanism
- cross-listed firms and firms in countries with strong institutional quality are less reliant – if at all – on their countries' political ties as a means for lowering their borrowing costs







Related studies I

- Importance of socio-political and institutional factors in the pricing of international debt and determinants of cross-border financing
- Qian and Strahan (2007 JF); Bae and Goyal (2009 JF); Qi, Roth, and Wald (2010 JFE); Giannetti and Yafeh (2012 MS); Delis Hasan and Ongena (2020 JFE)
- 1) Politically-connected banks receive more favorable regulatory treatment and relief legislation
- lobbying by U.S. banks influences regulatory enforcement actions; Lambert (2019 MS)
- politically-connected banks enjoy more favorable regulation; Braun and Raddatz (2010 WBER)
- U.S. domestic bailout policies: U.S. congressmen who received support from financial sector donors were more likely to vote in favor of the U.S. 2008 bailout legislation; Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi (2010 AER)







Related studies II

- Economic implications of forging global political ties
- 1) Political ties with the U.S. on the IMF lending
- > Thacker (1999 WP); Barro and Lee (2005 JP); Malik and Stone (2018)
- 2) Similarity indices on voting patterns at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) between sovereign states and the United States. As a general conclusion, global political ties:
- facilitate microfinance funding; Garmaise and Natividad (2013 JF)
- lower the cost of private bond issuances by foreign firms in the United States; Ambrocio, Gu and Hasan (2019)
- > lower sovereign borrowing costs; Ambrocio and Hasan (2019)
- Firm-to-state political ties affect external financing and firm valuation
- preferential access to bank financing and lower borrowing costs; Claessens, Feijen, and Laeven (2008 JFE); Houston, Jiang, Lin, and Ma (2014 JAR)



Data and Methodology





Data

- Loan-level data (loan facilities) from Dealscan
- > foreign loans; non-US borrowers
- Signorino and Ritter (1999) index of voting similarity
- Coverage period: 1992-2017
- Baseline specification: 10,472 loan facilities granted by 156 lead lenders headquartered in 12 countries to 1,115 borrowers from 25 countries
- Matching of loans with bank- and firm-specific accounting information from Compustat and macro-level variables from freely available sources
- Fixed effects: loan type and purpose, year, bank, firm, borrower's country
- standard error clustering: firm and year



Methodology

 $Cost \ of \ credit_{lt} = a_0 + a_1 Vote_{kt-1} + a_2 Controls_{kt} + u_{lt}$

- Cost of credit: all-in-spread drawn (AISD) which denotes the spread over LIBOR plus and facility fees
- Vote: The Signorino and Ritter 2-option index of voting similarity with U.S., averaged by UN session for issues deemed important by the U.S. State Department.
- Controls: vector of control variables (loan-, bank-, firm-, country-level characteristics)
- α0: different type of fixed effects
- > *a1*: the effect of *Vote* on the cost of credit





Voting similarity measure

$$Vote_{kt} = \frac{1}{R} \sum_{r=1}^{R} S2_{r,k,t}$$

- > **S2**: the Signorino-Ritter score (S2) of voting similarity with the U.S. for each resolution (r) in year t
- An index for voting affinity originally ranging from -1 (completely opposite interests) to +1 (completely similar interests), based on two-category vote data (1 = "yes" or approval of an issue; 2 = "no" or disapproval of an issue) in the U.N. General Assembly
- Signorino and Ritter (1999 ISQ); Garmaise and Natividad (2013 JF)





Empirical Results





Baseline results I

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Vote	-81.489**	-86.983**	-83.910**	-85.905**	-82.360**
	[-2.474]	[-2.325]	[-2.462]	[-2.541]	[-2.343]
Loan amount	-9.199***	-6.849**	-8.549***	-8.661***	-8.692***
	[-2.919]	[-2.491]	[-3.546]	[-3.616]	[-3.411]
Maturity	0.274**	0.283**	0.330**	0.326**	0.339**
	[2.274]	[2.587]	[2.396]	[2.348]	[2.522]
Collateral	47.929***	47.390***	33.396***	33.283***	29.846***
	[3.957]	[4.076]	[3.239]	[3.245]	[3.173]
Number of lenders	-0.786***	-0.683***	-0.533**	-0.532**	-0.514**
	[-3.158]	[-2.963]	[-2.463]	[-2.428]	[-2.545]
Performance provisions	-4.912	-5.696	-4.607	-4.527	-6.003
	[-0.918]	[-0.968]	[-1.172]	[-1.156]	[-1.578]
General covenants	3.438	3.770	6.942**	6.856**	6.909**
	[1.128]	[1.235]	[2.218]	[2.193]	[2.147]
Bank size	-9.642	-9.146	-1.414	-2.836	-2.507
	[-1.328]	[-1.251]	[-0.214]	[-0.424]	[-0.404]
Bank ROA	-0.639	-0.585	2.369	2.123	1.909
	[-0.177]	[-0.156]	[0.714]	[0.654]	[0.646]
Bank NPLs	-0.597	-0.561	-0.279	-0.346	-0.182
	[-1.064]	[-1.044]	[-0.495]	[-0.598]	[-0.362]
Firm size	-8.008	-4.850	-9.437	-9.936	-9.856
	[-0.930]	[-0.620]	[-1.247]	[-1.304]	[-1.387]
Firm ROA	-260.261***	-271.990***	-237.271***	-234.923***	-247.095***
	[-3.855]	[-4.232]	[-4.450]	[-4.391]	[-4.593]
Firm equity	-5.559	-6.684	-3.179	-2.881	-1.569
	[-0.889]	[-1.106]	[-0.527]	[-0.477]	[-0.276]
Firm debt	55.009	54.398	13.588	14.515	20.053
	[1.585]	[1.574]	[0.407]	[0.436]	[0.629]
GDP growth	-5.107***	-4.759**	-4.295**	-4.239**	-4.294**
	[-3.534]	[-2.639]	[-2.413]	[-2.394]	[-2.540]
GDP per capita	0.003*	0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	[1.999]	[0.141]	[-0.668]	[-0.701]	[-0.744]
Bilateral trade	-0.000**	-0.000**	-0.000*	0.000	0.000
	[-2.604]	[-2.125]	[-1.795]	[-1.321]	[-1.261]
Constant	538.413***	564.778***	581.859***	610.481***	594.074***
	[3.870]	[3.784]	[4.422]	[4.536]	[4.651]
Observations	10,479	10,479	10,472	10,472	10,427
Adj. R-squared	0.699	0.708	0.766	0.767	0.773





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Baseline results II

- Coefficients on variables of interest
- > Vote: 81.5-87 basis points
- a one-standard-deviation increase in *Vote* (equal to 0.16) lowers *AISD* by an average of 13.4 basis points (specification 3)
- Economic significance of Vote
- > 9.1% decrease for the average loan in our sample
- Interest savings:

USD 2.25 million per year (=\$1.68 billion × 13.4 basis points)

USD 9.92 million over the average loan's duration (=\$2.25 million × 4.4 years)







Non-U.S. Ioans vs U.S. Ioans

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Non-U.S. loans	U.S. loans	All loans
Vote	-85.549**	-90.073**	-73.038**
	[-2.107]	[-2.569]	[-2.191]
Vote \times U.S. lender			-20.170**
			[-2.526]
U.S. lender			4.171
			[0.550]
Observations	5,414	4,890	10,472
Adj. R-squared	0.793	0.754	0.766
Full set of controls	Y	Y	Y
Fixed effects	Y	Y	Y





Identification from war conflicts & geopolitical risk

- Implicit assumption if firms borrow at a lower interest rate if their sovereign of domicile is favorably disposed towards the U.S.
- <u>However</u>: This could be a temporary phenomenon during global tensions and conflicts, where sovereigns can capitalize on their support to the U.S.
- > notable discount in loans U.S. allies' corporates during the wars duration
- If borrowers also receive a lower interest rate after the end of the conflicts as an enticement to support U.S. proposals in the future
- > discount in spreads over and above that observed during the wars duration
- Interaction of *Vote* with indicators for the main stage of the Afghanistan, the Iraq, and the Syria war, and the geopolitical risk index (Caldara and Iacoviello, 2018)







Identification from war episodes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Vote	-85.234**	-89.151**	-109.301***	-93.246**
	[-2.457]	[-2.629]	[-3.443]	[-2.637]
Vote × Afghanistan war	-17.794*			
	[-2.025]			
Vote \times Iraq war		-38.911**		
		[-2.232]	-	
Vote × Syria war			-917.353**	
			[-2.039]	
Vote \times All wars				-44.358*
				[1.901]
Observations	10,472	10,472	10,472	10,472
Adj. R-squared	0.766	0.766	0.767	0.766
Full set of controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Fixed effects	Y	Y	Υ	Y





Geopolitical risk

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Vote	-89.187**	-90.226**	-84.480**
	[-2.596]	[-2.630]	[-2.414]
Vote × Geopolitical risk	-0.205*		
	[-1.718]		
Vote × Geopolitical risk (threats)		-0.188*	
		[-1.772]	
Vote × Geopolitical risk (acts)			-0.285**
			[-2.203]
Observations	10,472	10,472	10,472
Adj. R-squared	0.766	0.767	0.766
Full set of controls	Y	Y	Y
Fixed effects	Y	Y	Y





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U.S. political conditions

	(1)	(2)
Vote	-64.123*	-96.019**
	[-2.054]	[-2.595]
Vote × Republican party	-46.965**	
	[-2.295]	
Vote × U.S. elections		1.024
		[0.171]
Observations	10,472	10,472
Adj. R-squared	0.766	0.767
Full set of controls	Y	Y
Fixed effects	Y	Y



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Borrower fundamentals

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Vote	72.506	-63.894*	3.333	-120.061***	- 86.184**	-70.192**
	[1.157]	[-1.827]	[0.073]	[-3.607]	[-2.364]	[-2.095]
Vote × Firm size	-15.594**					
	[-2.068]					
Vote × Firm ROA		-286.756***				
		[-3.918]				
Vote × Firm equity			- 9.844**			
			[-2.091]	-		
Vote × Firm debt				110.253*		
				[1.691]		
Vote × Firm asset growth					-20.104*	
					[-1.751]	
Vote \times Firm retained earnings						-95.811***
						[-3.229]
Observations	10,472	10,472	10,472	10,472	10,149	10,451
Adj. R-squared	0.767	0.766	0.767	0.766	0.767	0.768
Full set of controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Fixed effects	Y	Υ	Y	Y	Y	Y







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Government banks

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Vote	-62.976*	-55.669*	-64.347**	-57.169*
	[-2.024]	[-1.844]	[-2.177]	[-1.890]
Vote × Government participant	-31.972			
	[-0.883]			
Government participant × U.S. lender		20.210		
		[0.760]		
Vote \times Government participant \times U.S. lender		-21.132		
		[-0.611]		
Vote × Government lead			-99.002*	
			[-1.747]	-
Government lead \times U.S. lender				71.098*
				[1.756]
Vote \times Government lead \times U.S. lender				-90.565*
				[-1.808]
Observations	10,194	10,194	10,194	10,194
Adj. R-squared	0.774	0.774	0.774	0.774
Full set of controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Fixed effects	Υ	Y	Y	Y







Lending relationships

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Vote	-80.724**	-82.131**	-84.993**
	[-2.387]	[-2.391]	[-2.508]
Vote × Lending relationship	-50.150*		
	[-1.866]		
Vote × Lending relationship number		-83.305*	
		[-2.055]	
Vote × Lending relationship amount			-83.554**
			[-2.101]
Observations	10,472	10,472	10,439
Adj. R-squared	0.766	0.766	0.767
Full set of controls	Y	Y	Y
Fixed effects	Y	Υ	Υ



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Country relationships

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Vote	-124.869**	-78.144**	-109.998***	-86.078**
	[-2.634]	[-2.310]	[-2.993]	[-2.283]
Vote × Alliance	49.887			
	[1.024]			
Vote × Direct contiguity		1.352		
		[0.030]		
Vote × Dependency contiguity			5.323	
			[1.255]	
Vote × Religion				5.181
_				[0.206]
Observations	10,472	10,472	7,969	10,472
Adj. R-squared	0.766	0.764	0.775	0.766
Full set of controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Fixed effects	Y	Y	Y	Y





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Cross-listing and institutional investors

- Listing on a foreign stock exchange
- commitment to provision of higher quality financial information; exposure to further scrutiny of reputable intermediaries
- > Lang, Raedy, and Wilson (2006 JAE); Shi, Magnan, and Kim (2012 WP)
- > minimization of information asymmetry; alternative financing sources
- Saudagaran (1988 JIBS); Hillman and Wan (2005 JIBS)
- Institutional quality
- > ability to attract institutional investors drives firm performance borrowing costs
- > Qian and Strahan (2007 JF); Qi, Roth, and Wald (2010 JFE)
- presence of institutional investors alleviates the need for banks to engage in monitoring (transfer of savings to firms); positive signal to lending banks
- > Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003 JB); Dyck, Lins, Roth, and Wagner (2019)
- Interaction of *Vote* with indicators for cross-listing and institutional quality and protection









Cross-listing and insitutional quality

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Vote	-93.101***	-89.116**	- 96.469*	-73.240*	-85.848*
	[-2.869]	[-2.795]	[-2.063]	[-1.944]	[-1.902]
Vote \times Cross-listed	46.253**				
	[2.166]				
Vote × Cross-listed in U.S.		48.531*			
		[1.684]			
$Vote \times Disclosure$			71.856**		
			[3.019]		
Vote \times Investor protection				80.567**	
				[2.651]	
Vote × Legal rights					37.385*
					[1.942]
Observations	10,362	10,362	6,963	5,941	6,773
Adj. R-squared	0.767	0.767	0.806	0.818	0.801
Full set of controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Fixed effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y





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Conclusions

- By using data from the global syndicated loan market we investigate whether state-to-state political ties with a global superpower affects the pricing of international bank loans
- A one-standard-deviation increase (improvement) in our political ties measure lowers loan spreads by approximately 13.5 basis points
- > 9.1% lower all-in spread drawn (AISD) for the average loan in our sample
- > interest savings: USD 2.3 million for loans of average size and duration
- Easing effect of political ties is magnified:
- during war conflicts and geopolitical risk tensions; under Republican administrations; with better borrower balance sheets and relationship lending
- Not all firms make us of this mechanism
- cross-listed firms and firms in countries with strong institutional quality rely less on their countries' political ties as a means for lowering their borrowing costs



Thank you very much for your attention!





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Background Slides





Different loan controls

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Vote	-96.834**	-85.196**	-91.821**	-87.355**
	[-2.395]	[-2.064]	[-2.328]	[-2.138]
Loan amount			-8.561***	-6.754**
			[-2.851]	[-2.767]
Maturity			0.278**	0.252*
			[2.105]	[1.887]
Collateral		41.322***		38.360***
		[3.626]		[3.459]
Number of lenders		-0.476*		-0.442*
		[-1.923]		[-1.994]
Performance provisions		-4.476	-3.633	
		[-0.807]	[-0.597]	
General covenants		4.800	7.954*	
		[1.197]	[1.807]	
Bank size	2.984	0.752	0.684	-0.886
	[0.455]	[0.116]	[0.110]	[-0.137]
Bank ROA	-0.107	0.797	8.733	10.577
	[-0.003]	[0.022]	[0.219]	[0.294]
Bank NPLs	-0.269	-0.241	-0.266	-0.286
	[-0.338]	[-0.310]	[-0.348]	[-0.383]
Firm size	-13.015	-15.738	-7.258	-11.643
	[-1.231]	[-1.639]	[-0.721]	[-1.190]
Firm ROA	-333.023***	-318.400***	-317.617***	-323.338***
	[-5.514]	[-5.323]	[-5.268]	[-5.590]
Firm equity	3.882	4.968	3.555	4.932
	[0.459]	[0.643]	[0.442]	[0.624]
Firm debt	30.187	23.188	29.451	25.720
	[0.745]	[0.647]	[0.741]	[0.696]
GDP growth	-5.833**	-5.492**	-5.637**	-5.604**
	[-2.566]	[-2.436]	[-2.467]	[-2.470]
GDP per capita	-0.004	-0.003	-0.004	-0.003
	[-1.568]	[-1.410]	[-1.596]	[-1.381]
Bilateral trade	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	[1.192]	[1.024]	[1.196]	[1.062]
Constant	454.215***	475.424***	592.411***	587.067***
	[3.965]	[4.060]	[4.658]	[4.370]
Observations	5,474	5,474	5,414	5,414
Adj. R-squared	0.782	0.788	0.788	0.793









Different voting measures

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	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Vote (non-normalized)	-51.278**			
	[-2.462]		_	
Vote (non-normalized current)		-44.745**		
		[-2.645]		
Vote (3-option)			-117.971*	
			[-2.034]	
Vote with us				-118.894*
				[-2.002]
Observations	10,472	10,493	8,745	8,086
Adj. R-squared	0.766	0.765	0.784	0.788
Full set of controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Fixed effects	Y	Y	Y	Y





IV regressions: 1st-stage regressions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Vote	Vote	Vote	Vote
US economic aid	-0.327	-0.260	-0.308	-0.306
	[-0.947]	[-0.954]	[-0.871]	[-1.040]
US military aid	-0.046*	-0.016*	-0.038	-0.022*
	[-1.989]	[-1.855]	[-1.624]	[-1.893]
Population	0.000	0.000**	0.000	0.001**
	[1.384]	[2.106]	[1.446]	[2.219]
Legal origin	-0.004	-0.004	-0.005	-0.003
	[-0.424]	[-0.378]	[-0.531]	[-0.260]
Polity	-0.007	-0.019	-0.006	-0.017
	[-0.479]	[-1.044]	[-0.420]	[-1.077]
Political rights	-0.012		0.005	
	[-0.573]		[0.177]	
Civil liberties	0.015		0.022	
	[0.749]		[1.041]	
Alliance		-0.005		-0.009
		[-0.341]		[-0.606]
Religion		0.058**		0.064**
		[2.147]		[2.132]
GDP growth (borrower)			0.005*	0.003
			[1.721]	[1.712]
GDP per capita (borrower)			0.000	-0.000
			[0.800]	[-1.176]
Constant	0.749***	0.852***	0.687***	0.850***
	[6.449]	[5.802]	[6.107]	[6.359]
Observations	315	315	315	315
Adj. R-squared	0.720	0.740	0.724	0.743
Year effects	Y	Y	Y	Y
Borrower's country effects	Y	Y	Y	Y









Results for AISU

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Vote	-0.544	-1.031	1.188	1.631	1.792
vole	[-0.050]	[-0.092]	[0.124]	[0.173]	[0.190]
AISD	0.233***	0.232***	0.237***	0.238***	0.235***
AISD	[9.343]	[9.079]	[10.335]	[10.360]	[9.826]
Loan amount	0.211	0.138	0.119	0.153	0.127
Loan amount	[0.417]	[0.283]	[0.222]	[0.292]	[0.258]
Maturity	0.071***	0.067**	-0.005	-0.003	-0.002
Maturity	[2.897]	[2.733]	[-0.104]	[-0.066]	[-0.051]
Collateral	1.452	1.336	2.038	2.033	1.618
Collateral	1.452	[0.357]	[0.619]	[0.621]	[0.521]
Number of lenders	0.014	0.016	0.004	0.003	0.014
Number of fenders	[0.251]	[0.294]	0.004	0.003	[0.298]
Performance provisions	0.210	0.314	-0.039	-0.074	0.015
Fertormance provisions	[0.174]	[0.254]	[-0.039]	[-0.064]	[0.012]
General covenants	-0.720	-0.659	-0.802	-0.839	-0.663
General covenants	[-0.558]	[-0.512]	[-0.802	-0.839	[-0.726]
Bank size	1.815	1.923	0.508	0.939	1.870
Dank size	[1.060]	[1.136]	[0.367]	[0.675]	[1.221]
Bank ROA	1.355	1.345	1.439*	1.518*	1.122
Bank ROA	[1.584]	[1.558]	[1.759]	[1.851]	[1.272]
Bank NPLs	0.063	0.044	-0.009	0.038	0.074
Dalk NFLS	[0.523]	[0.382]	[-0.080]	[0.358]	[0.678]
Firm size	1.851	1.943	3.627*	3.596	3.646*
Film size	[1.013]	[1.027]	[1.727]	[1.704]	[1.805]
Firm ROA	-21.78	-20.729	-18.217	-17.621	-18.305
FILLIKOA	[-1.432]	[-1.329]	[-1.154]	[-1.102]	[-1.167]
Firm equity	-3.057**	-2.942**	-3.330**	-3.318**	-3.761**
r nni equity	[-2.508]	[-2.361]	[-2.317]	[-2.330]	[-2.641]
Firm debt	-7.697	-6.384	-3.751	-3.609	-4.48
r initi debt	[-1.034]	[-0.843]	[-0.538]	[-0.511]	[-0.626]
GDP growth	-0.120	0.100	0.223	0.236	0.208
ODI giowai	[-0.242]	[0.199]	[0.474]	[0.502]	[0.435]
GDP per capita	-0.000**	-0.001**	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***
ODF per capita	[-2.635]	[-2.117]	[-3.079]	[-3.113]	[-3.260]
Bilateral trade	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Dilateral trate	[0.863]	[0.645]	[0.307]	[0.435]	[-1.235]
Constant	-1.918	15,789	28.41	21.942	13.2
Constant	[-0.064]	[0.490]	[1.070]	[0.817]	[0.518]
Observations	3.322	3,322	3.312	3.312	3.298
Adj. R-squared	0.890	0.891	0.903	0.904	0.905
muj. IC-squareu	V.07V	V.071	v.9v3	V.7V4	0.905









Different clustering

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Vote	-83.910**	-83.910***	-83.910**	-83.910***	-83.910***
	[-2.603]	[-2.836]	[-2.779]	[-3.033]	[-4.569]
Loan amount	-8.549***	-8.549***	-8.549***	-8.549***	-8.549***
	[-4.190]	[-4.562]	[-5.108]	[-3.855]	[-4.536]
Maturity	0.330*	0.330**	0.330**	0.330**	0.330*
-	[2.014]	[2.175]	[2.747]	[2.617]	[2.175]
Collateral	33.396**	33.396**	33.396***	33.396***	33.396**
	[2.543]	[2.635]	[3.600]	[2.874]	[2.450]
Number of lenders	-0.533*	-0.533**	-0.533***	-0.533**	-0.533**
	[-1.955]	[-2.199]	[-2.860]	[-2.508]	[-2.589]
Performance provisions	-4.607	-4.607	-4.607	-4.607	-4.607
-	[-0.956]	[-1.083]	[-1.455]	[-1.032]	[-1.216]
General covenants	6.942**	6.942**	6.942**	6.942*	6.942**
	[2.155]	[2.595]	[2.160]	[1.910]	[2.505]
Bank size	-1.414	-1.414	-1.414	-1.414	-1.414
	[-0.267]	[-0.318]	[-0.197]	[-0.217]	[-0.339]
Bank ROA	2.369	2.369	2.369	2.369	2.369
	[0.449]	[0.454]	[0.798]	[1.101]	[0.588]
Bank NPLs	-0.279	-0.279	-0.279	-0.279	-0.279
	[-0.411]	[-0.519]	[-0.544]	[-0.849]	[-0.743]
Firm size	-9.437	-9.437	-9.437	-9.437	-9.437
	[-0.887]	[-0.855]	[-1.476]	[-1.029]	[-1.019]
Firm ROA	-237.271**	-237.271**	-237.271***	-237.271***	-237.271**
	[-2.653]	[-2.753]	[-4.600]	[-3.973]	[-2.628]
Firm equity	-3.179	-3.179	-3.179	-3.179	-3.179
	[-0.509]	[-0.531]	[-0.673]	[-0.548]	[-0.540]
Firm debt	13.588	13.588	13.588	13.588	13.588
	[0.389]	[0.493]	[0.476]	[0.529]	[0.473]
GDP growth	-4.295	-4.295	-4.295**	-4.295**	-4.295*
-	[-1.600]	[-1.624]	[-2.702]	[-2.667]	[-1.887]
GDP per capita	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	[-0.497]	[-0.538]	[-0.760]	[-0.758]	[-0.622]
Bilateral trade	-0.000**	-0.000***	-0.000**	-0.000**	-0.000*
	[-2.110]	[-2.923]	[-2.280]	[-2.232]	[-2.005]
Constant	581.859***	581.859***	581.859***	581.859***	581.859***
	[3.625]	[3.605]	[3.915]	[3.730]	[4.982]
Observations	10,472	10,472	10,472	10,472	10,472
Adj. R-squared	0.766	0.766	0.766	0.766	0.766
Clustering	BC&Y	BC&F	B&Y	B&F	LC&BC







Weighted regressions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Vote	-83.828**	-83.853**	-83.406**	-83.305**	-83.828**
	[-2.461]	[-2.459]	[-2.457]	[-2.447]	[-2.461]
Loan amount	-8.550***	-8.545***	-8.528***	-8.452***	-8.550***
	[-3.541]	[-3.539]	[-3.608]	[-3.593]	[-3.541]
Maturity	0.329**	0.330**	0.333**	0.331**	0.329**
	[2.388]	[2.393]	[2.432]	[2.414]	[2.388]
Collateral	33.442***	33.406***	33.128***	33.002***	33.442***
	[3.248]	[3.248]	[3.231]	[3.232]	[3.248]
Number of lenders	-0.532**	-0.533**	-0.537**	-0.532**	-0.532**
	[-2.456]	[-2.463]	[-2.488]	[-2.466]	[-2.456]
Performance provisions	-4.549	-4.612	-4.419	-4.653	-4.549
	[-1.160]	[-1.172]	[-1.130]	[-1.185]	[-1.160]
General covenants	6.955**	6.962**	6.924**	6.965**	6.955**
	[2.229]	[2.239]	[2.175]	[2.222]	[2.229]
Bank size	-1.324	-1.476	-1.687	-1.633	-1.324
	[-0.201]	[-0.220]	[-0.258]	[-0.248]	[-0.201]
Bank ROA	2.298	2.364	2.292	2.394	2.298
	[0.694]	[0.712]	[0.692]	[0.725]	[0.694]
Bank NPLs	-0.266	-0.273	-0.296	-0.292	-0.266
	[-0.479]	[-0.473]	[-0.523]	[-0.514]	[-0.479]
Firm size	-9.528	-9.433	-9.086	-9.415	-9.528
	[-1.258]	[-1.247]	[-1.208]	[-1.248]	[-1.258]
Firm ROA	-236.424***	-237.154***	-236.171***	-236.418***	-236.424***
	[-4.435]	[-4.432]	[-4.429]	[-4.432]	[-4.435]
Firm equity	-3.114	-3.172	-3.359	-3.240	-3.114
	[-0.514]	[-0.525]	[-0.559]	[-0.538]	[-0.514]
Firm debt	14.098	13.563	12.828	13.992	14.098
	[0.421]	[0.406]	[0.386]	[0.422]	[0.421]
GDP growth	-4.293**	-4.297**	-4.342**	-4.319**	-4.293**
	[-2.410]	[-2.419]	[-2.474]	[-2.446]	[-2.410]
GDP per capita	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	[-0.662]	[-0.668]	[-0.650]	[-0.630]	[-0.662]
Bilateral trade	-0.000**	-0.000*	-0.000**	-0.000*	-0.000**
	[-2.140]	[-1.953]	[-2.173]	[-2.050]	[-2.140]
Constant	575.048***	582.163***	577.375***	576.682***	575.048***
	[4.383]	[4.407]	[4.484]	[4.454]	[4.383]
Observations	10,472	10,472	10,472	10,472	10,472
Adj. R-squared	0.766	0.766	0.766	0.766	0.766







Heckman regressions: 2nd-stage regressions

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Vote	-82.559**	-82.466**	-103.897**
	[-2.424]	[-2.407]	[-2.666]
Loan amount	-4.330	-3.797	-3.551
	[-1.191]	[-1.039]	[-0.739]
Maturity	0.318**	0.320**	0.097
	[2.286]	[2.306]	[0.770]
Collateral	44.687***	45.530***	43.099***
	[3.482]	[4.106]	[3.084]
Number of lenders	0.026	0.088	0.028
	[0.059]	[0.226]	[0.050]
Performance provisions	9.104	10.439	6.499
	[0.910]	[1.163]	[0.584]
General covenants	9.208**	9.523**	12.224***
	[2.722]	[2.779]	[3.799]
Bank size	11.264	12.758	11.786
	[1.186]	[1.473]	[1.004]
Bank ROA	1.584	1.472	2.802
	[0.468]	[0.434]	[0.783]
Bank NPLs	-1.512	-1.611	-0.982
	[-1.373]	[-1.607]	[-0.953]
Firm size	-10.080	-9.456	-5.855
	[-1.342]	[-1.266]	[-0.632]
Firm ROA	-226.549***	-225.661***	-164.492***
	[-4.251]	[-4.200]	[-2.813]
Firm equity	-4.313	-5.163	-8.544
	[-0.718]	[-0.863]	[-1.111]
Firm debt	22.211	21.598	6.792
	[0.664]	[0.639]	[0.180]
GDP growth	-4.373**	-4.365**	-5.023***
	[-2.438]	[-2.442]	[-2.908]
GDP per capita	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	[-0.694]	[-0.733]	[-0.516]
Bilateral trade	-0.000*	-0.000*	-0.000***
	[-2.025]	[-1.960]	[-2.870]
Lambda	42.566	46.593*	43.801
	[1.581]	[1.972]	[1.571]
Constant	282.218	249.776	260.749
	[1.217]	[1.183]	[1.027]
Observations	10,472	10,472	7,878
Adj. R-squared	0.766	0.767	0.780







Different firm and macro controls

COFDG

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Vote	-83.677**	-88.381**	-154.344***	-108.720**	-83.534**	-84.987**
	[-2.452]	[-2.444]	[-4.337]	[-2.532]	[-2.407]	[-2.519]
Firm leverage	-0.110					
	[-1.459]					
Firm asset growth		-16.145**				
		[-2.211]				
Firm retained earnings		-0.000*				
		[-2.045]				
Firm tangibility			-8.194			
			[-0.600]			
Firm credit rating			10.024***			
			[3.621]			
Debt-to-GDP				0.637		
				[1.503]		
Inflation				-2.577		
				[-1.132]		
Trade balance					-0.000	
					[-0.154]	
Polity					50.772***	
					[9.264]	
Interbank rate						-1.443
						[-0.501]
VIX						0.436
					00 /0 /	[0.875]
Constant	581.897***	613.449***	259.710	212.353	82.624	595.043***
	[4.415]	[4.405]	[1.165]	[0.959]	[0.483]	[4.238]
Observations	10,472	10,128	4,043	7,349	10,120	10,439
Adj. R-squared	0.766	0.767	0.813	0.762	0.767	0.766
Set of baseline controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Fixed effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y



Other loan characteristics

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Loan amount	Maturity	Collateral	General covenants
Vote	0.230	12.252*	-0.026	-0.247
	[0.713]	[1.914]	[-0.263]	[-1.079]
AISD	-0.001***	0.023**	0.000***	0.000*
	[-3.374]	[2.574]	[3.320]	[2.013]
Loan amount		1.251**	-0.027***	0.007
		[2.125]	[-3.361]	[0.439]
Maturity	0.002**		0.001	-0.000
	[2.069]		[1.555]	[-0.268]
Collateral	-0.296***	4.395		0.320**
	[-3.429]	[1.597]		[2.371]
Number of lenders	0.012**	0.127*	-0.003***	-0.000
	[2.666]	[1.920]	[-3.332]	[-0.240]
Performance provisions	0.068	-0.040	0.016	0.367+++
	[0.945]	[-0.024]	[0.555]	[5.233]
General covenants	0.017	-0.230	0.072***	
	[0.447]	[-0.271]	[3.086]	
Bank size	-0.026	2.189	0.033	0.054
	[-0.884]	[1.599]	[1.361]	[1.066]
Bank ROA	-0.030	0.068	0.005	0.011
	[-0.794]	[0.100]	[0.414]	[0.337]
Bank NPLs	0.006	-0.077	0.000	0.002
	[1.478]	[-0.682]	[0.099]	[0.526]
Firm size	0.415***	-3.840**	0.064++	0.018
	[6.128]	[-2.338]	[2.306]	[0.231]
Firm ROA	1.082**	20.047	0.079	-0.305
	[2.498]	[1.631]	[0.449]	[-0.617]
Firm equity	-0.041	0.602	-0.023	-0.003
	[-0.953]	[0.552]	[-1.175]	[-0.052]
Firm debt	0.265	4.878	0.173	0.186
	[0.743]	[0.667]	[1.355]	[0.892]
GDP growth	0.014	0.791**	0.002	0.002
	[1.002]	[2.337]	[0.396]	[0.108]
GDP per capita	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	[-1.412]	[-0.785]	[0.523]	[0.084]
Bilateral trade	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000
	[0.768]	[-0.632]	[0.476]	[-1.426]
Constant	17.511***	20.565	-0.322	-0.906
	[19.368]	[0.739]	[-0.648]	[-0.967]
Observations	10,472	10,472	10,472	10,472
Adj. R-squared	0.748	0.677	0.751	0.630









