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					|   |  | Volume 16, Issue No. 1, April 2009
    Valerica Vlad       and Sajal Lahiri*, Foreign Investment and Environment in a North-South Model with       Cross-border Pollution, 1-18  
 
Kazuharu Kiyono*, Incentives Towards Economic Integration as the Second-best Tariff       Policy,19-48  
 
Dong Heon Byun,       Jinbae Kim* and Joon Yong Shin, The Effects of Deferred       Compensation and Performance-based Compensation on Firm Value,49-68  
 
Wen-Jing Chang,       Yahn-Shir Chen* and Meng-Pei Chan, Impact of Audit Fee Deregulation on       Audit-market Competition,69-94  
 
Stella Cho* and       Oliver M. Rui, Exploring the Effects of China’s Two-tier Board System and Ownership       Structure on Firm Performance and Earnings Informativeness, 95-118  
 
Announcements, 119 
  
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          | Foreign Investment and Environment    in a North-South ModelValerica Vlada and Sajal    Lahirib*aPenn State Erie, The Behrend College
 bSouthern Illinois University    Carbondale
Abstract                We develop a North-South model with    cross-border pollution. In the South, pollution is abated by both private    producers and the public sector. The North suffers from cross-border    pollution from the South. The policy instruments are foreign aid for the    North, and funds for public abatement, emission tax rate, and a tax on    foreign capital, for the South. We characterize the Nash equilibrium under    two scenarios: foreign investment is (i) exogenous, and (ii) endogenous.    Under (i), we examine the effect of a reform where both foreign investment    and aid are changed in an income-neutral way. In the latter case, we analyze    the effect of a tax-induced change in foreign investment on pollution. In    both scenarios, an inflow of foreign investment unambiguously reduces the net    emission of pollution. JEL Classifications: Q28, F35, H41 Keywords: cross-border pollution, foreign    investment, foreign aid, public pollution abatement, private pollution    abatement |  |    
  
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          | Tax Evasion and the Optimal Tax  Treatment ofForeign-Source Income
Xiwen Fana and John Douglas  Wilsonb*aRadian Asset Assurance Inc.
 bMichigan State University
							Abstract
			 This paper models a capital-exporting country  that encounters difficulties in taxing foreign-source income, due to tax  evasion problems. The paper compares the country’s optimal effective tax rates  on the income from capital invested at home and abroad (including penalties  levied on detected tax evaders). It finds that tax evasion abroad does not  provide a justification for a relatively low effective rate on foreign-source  income. Under a variety of circumstances, foreign-source income should actually  be taxed at a relatively high effective rate, regardless of the severity of tax  evasion problems abroad. However, tax evasion abroad does tend to reduce the optimal  taxation of capital income both at home and abroad.  JEL  Classification: H21, H25, H26, H87Keywords: tax evasion, optimal taxation, capital tax, capital mobility |  |    
  
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          |  Incentives Towards Economic Integration as the Second-best Tariff Policy
Kazuharu Kiyono*aaWaseda University
Abstract 
 Economic integration such as free trade areas  (FTAs) and customs unions (CUs) allows importing countries to circumvent the  constraint of non-discriminatory tariffs posed by the most favored nation clause  in WTO and to employ (incomplete) tariff discrimination. Thus the second-best  choice for the importing country, if it does regional integration, is to choose  as the partner the exporting country that would have been subject to the lower  tariff under the full tariff discrimination. Regardless of the mode of  competition, we will find that such a partner tends to be less efficient than  other exporting countries, which implies that voluntary regional integration leads  the world economy to less efficient resource allocations.
 JEL Classifications: F12, F13, F15Keywords: economic integration, tariff  discrimination, second-best policy, conjectural variations, oligopoly |  |    
  
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          | The Effects of Deferred Compensation  andPerformance-based Compensation on Firm  Value
Dong Heon Byuna, Jinbae  Kim*b and Joon Yong ShinbaAgricultural and Fishery Marketing Corporation
 bKorea University
Abstract                This study  empirically investigates the effects of two incentive systems: (i) the deferred  compensation system, which involves paying lower (higher) compensation than the  industry average during employees’ early (later) service periods; and (ii) the  performance-based compensation system. Empirical results using employee-wage  data from Korean firms show that both the deferred compensation system and the  performance-based compensation system have positive associations with firm  value measured by Tobin’s Q. However, the associations between the two types of  incentive system and other value-relevant factors are not uniform. While the deferred  compensation system contributes to the enhancement of ROA and an improvement in  labor productivity, the performance-based compensation system stimulates sales  growth.  JEL  Classifications: J31, M52Keywords: compensation, incentive, deferred  compensation, performance, firm value |  |    
  
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          | Impact of Audit Fee Deregulation onAudit-market Competition
Wen-Jing Changa, Yahn-Shir  Chen*b and Meng-Pei ChancaNational Changhua University of Education
 bNational Yunlin University of Science and Technology
 cDeloitte & Touche, Taiwan
Abstract                In  1998, the audit fee standard was abolished by the Fair Trade Commission of  Taiwan. This study aims to investigate the effects of the cancellation of the  audit fee standard on audit-market competition of public companies during  1994–2002. The results indicate that after the event, the auditor excess entry  rate, auditor excess exit rate and audit-market-share mobility all increased, which  is consistent with the prediction of enhanced audit-market competition.  JEL  Classifications: M42Keywords: cancellation of audit fee floor,  audit-market-share mobility, auditor excess entry rate, auditor excess exit  rate |  |    
  
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        | Exploring the Effects of China’s  Two-tierBoard System and Ownership Structure  on Firm
 Performance and Earnings Informativeness
Stella Choa* and Oliver M.  RuibaUnited International College, Beijing Normal  University-Hong Kong Baptist University
 bThe Chinese University of Hong Kong
Abstract              This  study empirically explores whether, and how, selected attributes of China’s two-tier  board system affect Chinese firms’ performance and earnings informativeness.  Using a database of 4,623 firm-year observations over the 1999 to 2003 period,  we find some effects that mirror ones reported in non-Chinese settings, such as  positive correlations between firm performance and the proportion of  independent board of directors members (BoD) and the frequency of supervisory committee  (SC) meetings; as well as positive correlations between earnings  informativeness and the proportions of independent BoD and SC members. These  exploratory findings provide impetus for further research in the Chinese  setting.             JEL  Classifications: M40, G30Keywords: corporate governance, firm  performance, informativeness of earnings |  |    |  |  |  |