| Abstract: | We consider four financing schemes for a supplier with limited capital: bank loans, purchase order financing (POF), retailer loans and advance payments. We model players' interaction as Stackelberg games. We show that: (1) The bank loan helps the supplier to overcome the capital constraint and produce its desired quantity. (2) While the production quantity is retailer loans or advance payments can be either smaller or larger, the one under POF is always larger than the supplier's desired quantity. (3) No scheme is dominating in terms of players' own and chain's sake. (4) Different from retailer loans and advance payments, POF allows each player to obtain profits larger than that under bank loans. |
| Date: | 5 December 2016 |
| Time: | 9:30am - 10:00am |
| Speaker: |
Mr Weixiang Huang PhD Student Department of Management Sciences City University of Hong Kong |
| Venue: | Room 7-207, 7/F, Academic 3 |
[ Back ]
